Friends, Enemies, or Strangers? On Relationships between Public and Private Sector Service Providers in Hybrid Forms of Governance by Van der Heijden, Jeroen
 1 
Friends, enemies or strangers? On relationships between public and private sector 
service providers in hybrid forms of governance 
 
WORKING PAPER – PAPER ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION IN LAW AND POLICY, 2011 
 
Jeroen van der Heijden 
Australian National University, the Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet) 
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam Law School 
 
Abstract 
Hybrid forms of governance have special attention in literature on regulatory reforms. It is often 
assumed that a combination of public and private sector involvement in a regulatory regime is 
superior to “pure public” or “pure private” regimes. By paying close attention to such hybrids, this 
paper finds that hybrids have two key dimensions. First, the “amount” of public and private 
sector involvement in a hybrid; and second, the relationship between these sectors. Contrary to 
the former dimension, the latter hardly gets any attention in scholarship. This article addresses 
that knowledge gap. It introduces a typology of hybrids based on these two dimensions. A brief 
case study is introduced to discuss the value of the focus on relationships between public and 
private sector service providers.  
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I. Introduction 
In recent years scholarship has become increasingly sensitive to the way in which public services 
are delivered to their users. Monopolist public service delivery by public sector agencies 
repeatedly proves inadequate, with many scholars pointing out effectiveness and efficiency 
issues. To overcome such inadequacies private sector agencies are often introduced in the 
delivery of public services such as healthcare, transportation, energy and telecommunication. 
However, this privatization is also often found to result in shortfalls and repeatedly issues 
concerning equity and accountability are reported. Privatization appears to be a cure that comes 
with its own diseases.  
Aiming at combining the strengths of both sectors and overcoming their weaknesses, 
today many forms of public service delivery may be typified as hybrid forms of governance, or 
“hybrids” for short (Evers, 2005; Noorderhaven, 1995). In hybrids both public and private sector 
agencies operate in the same field. Although the “amount” of public and private sector service 
providers in a hybrid is a core focus  in studies on hybridization, this proportion is not the only 
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key feature of a hybrid. Another key feature is the interplay, or relationship between public and 
private sector parties in a hybrid. In this paper this relationship is looked upon as a part of the 
institutional setting within which the sectors operate. To date, this feature has had limited 
scholarly attention. 
This article argues that a focus on both the amount of the actors in a hybrid and the 
relationship between these actors provides us a better understanding of hybrid forms of 
governance and their effects. The discussion is organized as follows. First, I discuss the 
theoretical underpinnings of hybrid forms of governance. I  present existing frameworks of 
hybrids; and, based on literature on the ecology of organizations and ecosystems, provide an 
enhanced framework that distinguishes between different types of hybrids and the relationship 
between public and private sector service providers within these. In order to show the value of 
including this relationship to our research, I present an illustrative case study in which I look on 
one type of hybrid and two relationships within that hybrid type. The hybrid is public service 
delivery in Australian and Canadian construction policy, with a competitive relationship in 
Australia and a complementary relationship in Canada. Based on the illustrative case study I draw 
conclusions about the role of relationships between public and private sector service providers for 
our understanding of hybrids. It should be noted that the case study presented has an 
explorative character and is introduced for illustrative purposes only. 
 
II. Hybrid forms of governance 
Over the years we have witnessed a range of studies on the strengths and weaknesses of public 
service delivery by public sector agencies and by private sector agencies. It is not my aim here to 
provide a extensive discussion, as the topic has been discussed in great depth elsewhere (e.g. 
Hodge, 2000; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). I restrict myself to providing a brief overview in the 
form of a table summing up some of the main findings (see Table 1). 
 
***Table 1 about here*** 
 
If anything becomes clear from these studies, it is that both public and private sector service 
providers have strengths and weaknesses. Depending on what choice is made, tradeoffs will 
occur between various competing democratic values. As such we seem to have remained where 
James Q. Wilson left us about 20 years ago when he touched upon the debate: “over whether 
government services are better supplied by private sector organizations than by public agencies” 
(Wilson, 1989, 347). Now, many will say this critical remark is not entirely true. Over the years 
the debate has moved beyond the opposite categories of pure public and pure private 
organization of service delivery – if there has ever been such things as “pure” public or “pure” 
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private (cf. Rothstein, 1998, chapter 8). Current forms of public service delivery are often 
characterized by a certain mix of both public and private sector agencies, often referred to as 
hybrid forms of governance (Brandsen, van der Donk, & Putters, 2005; Elsner, 2004; Evers, 
2005; Lang, 2001; Lehmkuhl, 2008; Noorderhaven, 1995). This section first introduces existing 
models for analyzing such hybrids. These models are characterized by a focus on the agencies 
involved. The section continues by introducing a more enhanced model to analyze hybrids by 
including the relationship between these agencies. 
 
Existing typologies 
Following contemporary forms of governance, regulatory scholars have introduced a wide range 
of “grand ideas” to describe and analyze hybrids such as quasi-market arrangements (LeGrand & 
Bartlett, 1993), public-private-partnerships (Hodge & Greve, 2007), incorporation and concerted 
action (Huyse & Parmentier, 1990), covenants and contracting (van den Heuvel, 1994), and a 
range of self-regulatory initiatives, such as co-regulation (Gunningham & Grabosky, 1998), 
enforced self-regulation (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992),  sanctioned self-regulation and coerced self-
regulation (Price & Verhulst, 2005), or mandated self-regulation and mandatory partial self-
regulation (Rees, 1988). Although these scholars might be said to play a “language game” 
(Hodge & Greve, 2007, 547-8), a close analysis of their work learns that they refer to truly 
different hybrids, which are typified by the “amount” of public and private sector involvement in a 
hybrid (cf. Van der Heijden & De Jong, 2009). This is the first, and most analyzed, key dimension 
of hybrids. 
 Another close analysis of hybrids learns that they can roughly be split into three types:  
1. hybrids in which every task comes to either a public or private sector agency – 
referred to as solitaries throughout the article;  
2. hybrids in which some or all tasks are taken up by a joint organization of public 
and private sector agencies – referred to as affiliations throughout the article; 
and 
3. hybrids in which some or all tasks can come to both public and private sector 
agencies –referred to as optionals throughout the article.  
Some examples might illustrate this point.  
A classic example from the first type is the contracting out of services; for instance, 
waste collection. Under such a contracting regime rules and regulations for waste collection will 
be set by a public authority. Waste collection itself is carried out by one or more private sector 
agencies. Any oversights on this service delivery are taken up by a public agency, as is the 
dealing with complaints from service receivers – the general public. Here a number of public and 
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private sector agencies work together within a hybrid waste collection regime. Yet, they all have 
clearly defined and non-overlapping tasks (example from: McDavid, 1985).  
A classic example from the second type is public-private partnerships; for instance, the 
development and operation of highways. Under such a partnership rules and regulations for 
highways are set by a public authority. The development of plans for the highway will be jointly 
taken up by public and private sector agencies, as will the investment. The building of the 
highway will be taken up by a private sector agency, as will the operation of the highway. The 
income of this operation will either be split amongst the public and private sector agencies, or the 
private sector agency is allowed to only operate the highway for a certain period of time. Here a 
number of public and private sector agencies work together within a hybrid highway 
development and operation regime. In some levels of the regime they all have their own clearly 
defined and non-overlapping tasks; in other levels they jointly take up a single task. The public 
and private sectors merge into a single organization (example from: Vining, Boardman, & 
Poschmann, 2005).  
Finally the third type, a classic example of which is freedom of choice; for instance, 
primary schools. Under such a choice regime a public authority sets rules and regulation for 
primary schools. The operation of primary schools is taken up by public and private sector 
agencies. Contrary to the previous hybrid type, the public and private sector agencies do not 
work jointly, but operate their own schools as individual service providers. As such choice 
between public and private schools exist for service receivers (yet, critics to choice regimes state 
that choice often does not exist, or is limited by certain factors - a good overview of these factors 
is provided by Fotaki et al., 2008). In practice, the public and private sectors have to compete for 
clientele. Here a number of public and private agencies work together within a hybrid primary 
school regime. In some levels of the regime they all have their own clearly defined and non-
overlapping tasks; in other levels they individually take up a similar task (example from: 
Rothstein, 1998). 
 The separation of tasks within a hybrid shows us a second, but under-researched key 
dimension: the relationship between public and private sector agencies within a hybrid. We have 
at least seen ‘merging’ in the second example and ‘competition’ in the final example. Allow me to 
make an excursion into literature on the ecology of organizations and ecosystems, to gain insight 
into what types of relationships might exist between public and private sector agencies within a 
hybrid.1 
 
Enhanced typology 
The presence of both public and private sector agencies within a hybrid reminds us of 
ecosystems. Just as two or more species might share a single biotope, so do public and private 
 6 
sector agencies, in the above examples, share the task environment of a single hybrid. 
Furthermore, just as species that share a single biotope stand in a certain relationship, so do 
different agencies within their hybrid. In ecosystems literature this is referred to as symbioses. 
 Ecosystems literature initially defined symbioses in a narrow sense as a situation in which 
two or more dissimilar entities live in or on one another in an intimate relationship (Roossinck, 
2008, 157). In a broader sense, symbiosis is referred to as a situation in which two or more 
dissimilar entities share a single environment (Stachowicz, 2001). What is essential about 
symbiosis is that these dissimilar entities stand in a certain relationship and have to survive on 
limited resources. Ecologists distinguish three basic types: mutualism, commensalism and 
antagonism (Roossinck, 2008; Stachowicz, 2001). Mutualism is a situation in which both entities 
benefit from the relationship – this might also be a neutral or passive relationship. Commensalism 
is a situation in which one entity benefits from the relationship, whilst the other neither benefits 
nor is disadvantaged by the relationship. Antagonism is a situation in which one entity benefits 
from the relationship, whilst the other is disadvantaged – in extreme situations even both entities 
are disadvantaged by the relationship. Here we see a parallel with “variable-sum games”: when 
one entity gains, the other does not have to lose per se (Schelling, 1980 [1960], 5). 
 In a hybrid similar effects might occur as a result of relationships between different 
agencies. This assumption is backed up by literature on organizational ecology. Scholars such as 
Barnard (1938, 101-3) and Jordan, Wurzel, and Zito (2005, 481) distinguish a number of possible 
relationships. Organizations can cooperate and complement one and other without merging into 
a new organization – this might be both an active and a passive relationship. Organizations can 
complement one and others by merging into a new organization – as such the relationship 
disappears. Organizations can compete for clientele without aiming at taking each other’s place. 
Furthermore, organizations can compete for clientele aiming at taking each other’s place – in 
which the relationship might disappear once one organization takes over the place of the other. 
These relationships shall be addressed as five types: cooperation, complementary, merging, 
competitive, and rivalry. All things being considered, these are relationships of a different nature. 
The nature of the relationship is considered from underlying mechanisms – cooperation, 
complementary and competitive; or from its intended outcome – merging and rivalry.   
Cooperation, complementary and merging can be considered as mutualism or 
commensalism: either public sector agencies or private sector agencies, or both benefit from the 
relationship. Competitive and rivalry can be considered as antagonism: one sector’s agencies 
benefit from the relationship, whilst the others are disadvantaged – in extreme situations even 
both sectors’ agencies are disadvantaged by the relationship. Note that merging and rivalry are 
non-durable relationships: the goal of the relationship is to end the relationship. Note 
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furthermore that some find that if the service provider suffers, its clients –receivers of public 
services – may also suffer from the relationship (cf. Hodge, 2000, chapter 2). 
Then, if a relationship within a hybrid is durable the public and private sector agencies 
mutually have to survive on limited resources in their task environment. Again ecosystems 
literature provides inspiration: the aggressive or friendly invasion of a new species in a biotope. 
Besides the relationship that will develop between the native species and the invasive, the 
survival of the species will depend on their ability to adapt to the new situation. The new specie 
might suffer from native species as the latter consumes the limited resources present and might 
have an omnipotent presence; it might gain from specialization on unused resources, or develop 
the ability to outcompete the native species (cf. Schwarz, Matta, Shakir-Botteri, & McPheron, 
2005). Native species might suffer from the invading specie when resources have to be shared; it 
might have an advantage over the invading specie given its presence in and knowledge of its 
territory (cf. Walters & Mackay, 2005). 
Similar processes have been discussed in organization and implementation literature. A 
classic author from the field, Chester Barnard,  noted in 1938 that organizations have to adapt 
and specialize in order to survive (Barnard, 1938, 91-92, chapter 10). Specialization can be 
achieved through technical expertise by minimizing efforts to gain resources (cf. Leibenstein, 
1966), or by finding and exploiting a relevant niche (cf. Freeman & Hannan, 1983). In public 
service delivery the resources in the task environment that have to be shared are service 
receivers – and, of course, their funds. 
Just like invasive species in a biotope might suffer from already present species, or have 
an advantage over it, so do agencies in a hybrid. For example, existing public agencies might 
suffer from a classic prejudice of being cumbersome, non-client friendly, and gridlocked (Eggers, 
2005), or might gain from a good reputation built up in the past (Fombrun, 1995). Already 
present agencies in a task environment can, relatively easily, undertake protectionist measures 
since they are familiar with the field and its players (MacManus, 1992). At the same time new 
agencies might gain from knowledge of the situation, for instance by specializing on those 
aspects that fell short in the pre-hybrid situation (Wilson, 1989, 188-182) or cream off the 
profitable jobs (Van Slyke, 2003). Or, the newcomers might be very motivated to make the 
hybrid work, which might make them willing to work harder for less revenue than existing 
agencies (Sanderson, 2002).  
 Bringing all this together, and rounding up our excursion into literature on the ecology of 
organizations and ecosystems, it logically follows that certain relationship types come to certain 
hybrid types. First, in hybrid type 1, solitaries, there is no relationship of the kind described in 
this section between public and private sector agencies. If there is a relationship, it will be a 
principal-agent relationship, as is for example the case in contracting out. Note however that 
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some of the relationships described in this section might exist amongst private sector agencies 
that aim to become service providers. Second, in hybrid type 2, affiliations, characterized by joint 
organization of public and private sector agencies, durable relationships might be merging or long 
term cooperative. A non-durable relationship may be temporarily cooperative, or “merging for the 
time being” (cf. Hill, Hitt, & Hoskinsson, 1992). Here the analytical difficulty will be to distinguish 
amongst what counts as “long term” and what counts as “temporary”. Finally, in hybrid type 3, 
optionals, the durable relationships between public and private sector agencies might be 
complementary or competitive. A non-durable relationship may be rivalry.  
Table 2 provides an enhanced framework for studying hybrids. It presents a typology of 
hybrids, their arrangement of tasks, and the possible relationship(s) between public and private 
sector agencies that might exist in each type. 
 
***Table 2 about here*** 
 
In the remainder of this article I use an illustrative case study to demonstrate how the enhanced 
framework may help us to gain a better understanding of hybrid forms of governance than by 
looking at the amount of public and private sector involvement only. I focus on one hybrid-type, 
hybrid type 3, and two relationships within that hybrid type, a competitive and complementary 
relationship between agencies. The study provides a better understanding of why the outcomes 
of two apparently comparable hybrids, when looking at the amount of public and private sector 
involvement only, differ as a result of different relationships within the two hybrids.  
 
 
III. Illustrative case study: rationale, cases, and methodology 
This section introduces the reader into the background of the study.  It begins with the 
theoretical rationale and continues with a brief introduction of the cases studied, and the 
methodology used for data collection and analysis. 
 
A. Rationale for the case study: comparing the impact of competitive and complementary 
relationships 
Competition has long been regarded as the incentive to improve effectiveness and efficiency of 
service delivery (Becker & Stigler, 1974; Landes & Posner, 1975). Following these early advocates 
of competitive private sector involvement in public service delivery, Osborne and Gaebler in their 
highly influential work Reinventing Government (1992, p. 309) have advocated “market-oriented 
government” that should do “more steering and less rowing” (ibid, p. 103). These authors 
strongly advocated competition as relationship, because competition is expected to reward 
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innovation – improving quality, keeping down costs – and would thus become an incentive to do 
so (ibid. 88-92, also Williamson, 1996, 119). Yet, over the years it has become clear that 
competition in public service delivery also has negative side effects. The accountability of 
competitive private sector service providers is frequently questioned (cf. May, 2007; Power, 
1999). Further, as a result from a creaming attitude some find that not all service receivers are 
treated likewise when service providers have to compete for clientele, which may result in issues 
related to equity (Amirkhanyan, 2008; Morgan & England, 1988). 
  A complementary relationship between public and private sector service providers has 
had less attention in governance studies. However, we are familiar with complementary 
relationships. Especially in self-regulation and voluntary programs literature we see that private 
sector organizations often introduce their own regulatory regimes in addition to public regulatory 
regimes. This is done for various reasons – for example to prevent the implementation of strict 
regulation by a public regulator, or to distinguish a group of organizations from other market 
players (e.g. Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Potoski & Prakash, 2009; Young, 2000). Such initiatives 
complement  public regulatory regimes; and, following the terminology of this paper, hybridize 
such regimes.  
As with competition different outcomes are reported on hybrids in which public and 
private sector service providers face a complementary relationship. Private sector actors  may 
take up issues that would otherwise remain unresolved. A regime might therefore become more 
effective (cf. Potoski & Prakash, 2009). Furthermore private sector actors are expected to be 
better able to address issues within their own sector, as they are more familiar with this 
environment than public sectors agencies are. A regime might therefore become more efficient 
(cf. Baldwin & Cave, 1999, chapter 4). Also in these regimes accountability is considered an 
issue. Accountability strongly depends on the strength and enforcement of a voluntary or self-
regulatory regime’s rule system (cf. Potoski & Prakash, 2009, chapter 2). This may result in 
comparable accountability issues as discussed under the competitive relationship. Equity, finally, 
may be a lesser issue under a complementary relationship. After all, a general level of regulation 
or service is provided by the public sector, and those wishing to set or receive a higher level may 
do so in the private sector (cf. Rothstein, 1998, chapter 8). 
These studies however do keep a strong focus on the impact of private sector service 
providers as opposed to public sector service delivery – in the competitive relationship literature; 
or on the impact of a hybrid regime as opposed to a pure public regime – in the complementary 
relationship literature. The relationship between service providers appears more taken as a given 
than as a, or the, topic of inquiry in these studies. Thus, it is not surprising that in both strands 
of literature comparable findings are reported as they in practice only focus on the introduction of 
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private sector service delivery in a former pure public regime. They learn us little about the 
impact of the relationship between public and private sector service providers in hybrids. 
 
B. Cases 
The context of the research is service delivery in Australian and Canadian construction policy.2 
This context was chosen as in Australia and Canada certain construction policy related public 
services can be taken up by public and private sector agencies – they fit hybrid type 3. The 
countries and the particular sector were chosen for their high comparability in hybrid 
environment and structure: the countries have a comparable government and judicial system 
(Dickerson & Flanagan, 1998; Jackson & Jackson, 2003); construction is regulated by comparable 
building codes (ABCB, 2004; NRCC, 2005); the countries have similarly divided tasks and 
responsibilities with regard to construction policy amongst national, regional and local 
governments (Hansen, 1985; Lovegrove, 1991) and private sector agencies (Van der Heijden, 
2010a, 2010b); and finally, have an analogous approach towards the privatization of public 
services (Özkaya & Askari, 1999). 
 There is, however, one major difference between the countries: in Australia a 
competitive relationship exists between the public and private sector service providers, providing 
clients – service receivers – a choice over who to involve in their construction work (PC, 2004). In 
Canada a complementary relationship exists between the public and private sector service 
providers. Public sector agencies may choose which services to deliver. Private sector agencies 
are allowed to take up those tasks which are not taken up by public sector agencies (Van der 
Heijden, 2010b). 
 The services delivered are the assessment of building plans against the building codes; 
the issuance of building permits when plan-assessment makes a reasonable case for compliance; 
the assessment of work under construction; and, the issuance of occupancy permits when 
construction work assessment makes a reasonable case for compliance. Note that building code 
assessment is typically a preventive strategy. As a result there is often no proof of full 
compliance; at best an acceptable level of certainty can be reached (cf. Sparrow, 2008). 
 A final reason to choose Australia and Canada as case studies is that in both countries 
private sector agencies have been introduced early on in the privatization movement – the 1980s 
in Canada, the 1990s in Australia. In both countries private agencies were introduced as an 
addition to a former “pure” public organization of service delivery. It may be expected that the 
growing pains of the implementation have been overcome, whilst at the same time many of 
those involved in the hybrids have experience with both the old “pure” public organization as 
with the “new” hybrids. This provides a unique chance to analyze how different dynamics for the 
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hybrids, a competitive playing field in Australia and a more coordinated playing field in Canada, 
works out in practice. 
 
C. Data collection and analysis 
The question driving this research is  how does a complementary or competitive relationship 
between public and private service providers affect service delivery?   I approached this question 
using a qualitative research approach, as the strength of such an approach is exactly to explore 
“how” questions (see a variety of discussions in Brady and Collier 2004). 
 Both Australian and Canadian data are based on a series of semi-structured in-depth elite 
interviews (McCracken, 1988; Richards, 1996) to gain an understanding of why the new hybrid 
situation was implemented and how the new situation is experienced by different sets of actors. I 
interviewed policymakers who are responsible for introducing and overseeing hybrids to gain 
insight into issues relating to the accountability of those delivering services. I interviewed service 
providers, both public and private, to gain insight into how the delivery of services is experienced 
from a supply point of view. I interviewed service receivers – architects, engineers, contractors, 
representative bodies of the general public – to gain insight into how the delivery of services is 
experienced from a demand point of view. I selected interviewees using snowball sampling 
(Longhurst, 2003). This sampling resulted in a pool of potential interviewees from various 
backgrounds. Most (>90%) having experience with the former “pure” public organization of 
service delivery and the “new” hybrid. Based on their availability and my presence in the 
countries I could interview 56 persons in Australia and 47 in Canada. Table 3 provides an 
overview of the interviewees’ background and their role in the hybrid. 
 
***Table 3 about here*** 
 
Interviews were based on a series of open-ended questions constructed around the following 
four main themes: Why was the hybrid introduced?; How does the hybrid operate in daily 
practice?; How is the hybrid evaluated?; Why are the goals that underpin the hybrid (not) 
achieved? Appendix A provides an overview of all interview questions. By continuously moving 
between these four main questions I aimed to cross-check validity between interviewees’ 
answers during the interview – for instance it proved me with a structure to build in checks and 
balances within the in-depth interviews (cf. Silverman, 2001). On average interviews took 90 
minutes. Interviews were recorded and transcribed into a report that I sent back to interviewees 
for validation (Fielding & Fielding, 1986). Roughly three months after the interview, I sent a 
follow-up questionnaire stating 20 of the most frequently stated topics. For instance: “[private 
sector service delivery] and conflicts of interest go hand in hand due to commercial pressure”.  
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Interviewees were requested to react to these statements based on a four point forced Likert-
scale. As such I introduced the possibility to interviewees to react, to a certain extent, to each 
other’s statements; and at the same time created the possibility to check the consistency 
between their interview statements and their agreement or disagreement with the questionnaire 
statements. Overall, these were consistent. Note that this statement questionnaire was returned 
by 27 (48%) of Australian interviewees and 16 (35%) of Canadian interviewees. 
 The final instrument for gathering data was the collection and analysis of existing 
research reports, government documentation, and inquiries on the topic. Contrary to my 
expectations I could not obtain extensive direct data that would strengthen the experiences as 
shared by the interviewees. Little to no records are kept on, for instance, building permits issued 
by public and private sector agencies; processing times; or, traced breaches with regulations. 
 In order to analyze the obtained data from the interviews, I coded these from rough to 
fine by means of a systematic three step coding scheme (cf. Seale & Silverman, 1997; Silverman, 
2001): I first coded interview data based on characteristics of the hybrid – for example 
competitive or complementary relationship – and the interviewee; second, I coded data based on 
the focus of the research questions – for example experienced changes in effectiveness, 
efficiency, equity or accountability compared to the prior situation; third, I coded data based on 
issues discussed – for example conflicts of interest, or commercial pressure. I used computer 
aided software, the program Atlas.ti, to run queries. By using this method I was able to treat 
pieces of information in a comparable and systemized manner, thus gaining insight into 
“repetitive” and “deviant” experiences. I used the data from the statement questionnaire to check 
the consistency of repetition of experiences. Overall, these were consistent. As I consider data 
from the statement questionnaire, compared to the interview data, to be provoked I have treated 
it for checking interview data validity only. In itself the statement questionnaire data does not 
add new information; it merely provides a quantification of interview data. Finally, QCA 
(qualitative comparative analysis, see Ragin, 2000; Ragin & Strand, 2008) logic and tools were 
applied to trace patterns in the data. 
 To sum up, I interviewed a range of actors involved in the new hybrids. I posed a series 
of questions to gain insight into experienced changes of the new hybrid situation compared to 
the former pre-hybrid situation in the cases analyzed – this pre-hybrid situation was pure public 
service delivery in all cases. The findings presented in the following section should therefore be 
understood as elite experiences (cf. Lee & Whitford, 2009). 
 
IV. Illustrative case study: findings 
In order to show the relevance of the inclusion of the relationship between public and private 
sector service providers in the studies of hybrid forms of governance, this section presents three 
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illustrative findings from the case study. More general findings on the strengths and weaknesses 
of privatizing service provision in construction policy in Australia and Canada are reported 
elsewhere (Van der Heijden, 2010a, 2010b). 
  In this section I will, to clearly distinguish between public and private sector service 
providers in the hybrids studied, use two abbreviations. MBCD refers to municipal building control 
departments, which are the public sector service providers in the hybrids analyzed. PSIA refers to 
private sector inspection agencies, the private sector service providers in the hybrids analyzed. 
 
A. Animosity versus cooperation 
Competition may be regarded both an instrument and a value. In the Australian cases 
competition appears introduced as a value, more than as an instrument (PC, 2004). Yet, this 
competition is taken very literally by those working in the new hybrids. Interviewees from all 
groups targeted referred to animosity between the two sectors’ workers. An Australian public 
sector representative expressed this as: “The biggest pitfall in the system is the non-acceptance 
of private and council building surveyors of each other’s work”. Under the current Australian 
regimes it appears the competitive relationship has related in two fully separated groups of 
service deliverers, yet aiming at comparable goals: a safe, healthy and durable built environment. 
The groups have become strangers as an Australian private sector representative illustrates: 
“When we all worked-on under local government (…) there was a lot more sharing of knowledge 
and skills and it worked a lot better. Now there seem to be these two groups (…) and there’s 
definitely a split between the two groups”. 
 The Canadian narrative was different. The complementary relationship was experienced 
to result in cooperation between the groups. A Canadian public sector service provider sketched 
the scene as: “It’s not competition; it’s working side by side”. Even more, Vancouver based PSIAs 
explained they involve MBCD staff when they are faced with non-compliance issues they cannot 
solve themselves; whereas the Vancouver MBCD fully relies on PSIAs to assess complex 
construction work. Canadian interviewees from both the public and private sectors stressed the 
importance of such cooperation as it made them aware of each other’s strengths and knowledge.  
 Framing the relationship “aggressively” as competition, as done in Australia, clearly has a 
different impact than framing the relationship more friendly as complementary, as done in 
Canada. On a day-to-day basis it hampers interaction and learning between the groups through 
the sharing of the actual service providers’ tacit knowledge (cf. de Bruijn, 2007). On the long run, 
as an Australian architect indicated, it may even have an impact on policy making: “Local 
government used to have a large role in the input of regulations. This was based on experiences 
in the field. Now the loopback from Council to State or Federal government has been lost.” And, 
so she explained, PSIAs do not report issues they encounter in the field back to the Council, 
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State or Federal government. Both on a day to day basis as on the long run this may negatively 
impact on the hybrids effectiveness. 
 
B. Overweight government versus lean government 
In both Australia and Canada PSIAs are capable of specializing in certain niche markets and 
therefore are able to provide specialist service – whereas MBCDs face difficulty in specializing 
since they have to deal with all work offered. An Australian service receiver explained: “If 
someone wants to build, say, a car-station or a major facility then [MBCDs] don’t know how to 
deal with that. So you can bring in a specialist [PSIA]”. Furthermore, PSIAs often face less layers 
of administration than MBCDs do and can pay their staff to work extra hours – which often is 
impossible for MBCDs. As such PSIAs are generally able to provide a more specialized and speedy 
assessment process than MBCDs can.  
As a result, in Australia clients involved in specialist or major works prefer PSIA 
involvement over MBCD involvement in their construction works. Yet, this resulted in a situation 
of MBCDs losing large amounts of revenue – fees for assessment and permit issuance are a 
percentage of the total building costs. In order to overcome this loss of revenue and win back the 
profitable jobs, MBCDs hire specialists alongside their generalist staff. MBCD staff is however 
location bound – they can only work within the MBCD’s jurisdiction – whereas the specialists of 
PSIAs can work, like their clients with whom they often build a long term working-relationship, all 
over Australia. Clients involved in major construction work do therefore not appear to move back 
to MBCD involvement. In short, mismatches were reported between MBCDs capacity to provide 
service and services required. 
In Canada, MBCDs have a choice as to what level of services to provide. In the case of 
the Greater Vancouver Regional District (population over two million), MBCDs only provide a 
general level of services, suitable to most clients involved in non specific, non complex works. 
Clients involved in specialists or major construction works are advised to have their work 
assessed by PSIAs. This has resulted in a situation in which MBCDs hold a specific kind of staff: 
generalists. As in Australia, clients involved in specialist or major construction works find their 
way to PSIAs. Compared to their Australian counterparts these Canadian MBCDs holds staff that 
is tailored to the level of service they provide and the specific group of clients they serve. A 
former chief of the Vancouver MBCD, a public sector service deliver, explained the advantaged of 
such tailoring: “If it wasn’t for the [PSIAs] City Hall would have had to double staff now, and lay 
them off during slower times”. The problem, so he continued, is that is difficult to lay off public 
staff.  
The City of Vancouver’s MBCDs can thus be regarded as fitting a trend of “lean 
government” (Haschold & Von Otter, 1996). A relatively small and non-specialist staff is less 
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expensive to maintain, than a somewhat too large and somewhat too specialist staff. The latter is 
the case at many Australian MBCDs. Here it can be argued that the competitive relationship in 
Australia results in an inefficient hybrid: unique means are not used for unique goals 
(Leibenstein, 1966). 
 
C. Activism versus passivism 
Hiring specialists is however not the only attempt of Australian MBCDs to win back their turf. 
Interviewees reported a trend of MBCDs taking over the characteristics of PSIAs: providing more 
streamlined, more client friendly, and more knowledgeable services (cf. PC, 2004, 221; VCEC, 
2005, 82). This confirms findings by Price (2007, 1149-1150) who reports likewise up skilling of 
public agencies in response of facing competitive private sector counterparts. 
 The Canadian narrative was, again, different. Instead of aiming to skill their services up 
to the level of PSIAs, the complementary relationship provided the Canadian MBCDs the 
possibility to take a different path. Two examples are illustrative. In the Greater Region of 
Vancouver MBCDs have specialized in minor and more general building works – often referred to 
as ‘the moms and pops jobs’, such as house alterations, carports and fences. This “specialization” 
may however be termed ‘down skilling’ since the MBCSs are unable to assess the more complex 
and major work, which they leave to PSIAs. As we have seen, this is considered a fruitful 
cooperation since the now lean MBCDs do not have to hold specialized, and thus, expensive staff. 
The example of the Province of Alberta provides some insight in what might happen if the MBCDs 
lose too much expertise and involvement. 
 In Alberta PSIAs were introduced expecting that a large number of small PSIAs would be 
scattered over the province. Over time, however, the larger PSIAs started to buy out the smaller 
ones, resulting in a situation in which currently five PSIAs hold the majority of the market. In 
parallel to this development, Albertan MBCDs left more and more work to PSIAs, with some 
MBCDs even fully stepping back from delivering construction policy related services. Yet, so 
explained a provincial official, the province has become too dependent on the PSIAs. With only a 
small number PSIAs in the field, the provincial government faces difficulties in “steering” their 
behavior when, for example, it is found their work does not meet legal standards. The strongest 
measure the provincial government can take is to withdraw a PSIA’s license, which in practice 
means that it has to cease operations. However, taking an PSIA out would imply that 
construction policy related services will no longer be carried out in parts of the province. This 
provincial official therefore wondered, “What would we do if [PSIAs] close their doors?” 
 Although complaining that the requirements from the pre-hybrid situation – regulated 
fees, regulated wages, requirement to deal with all work provided – prevents them from fully 
competing with the PSIAs (NSW Parliament, 2002: 112-113), addressing competition as a value 
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appears to have risen activism at the Australian MBCD level. Instead of down skilling and losing 
expertise, as their Canadian counterparts have, they still are a match to the PSIAs, providing the 
State and Federal governments some independency from the PSIAs. This might positively impact 
on the legitimacy and accountability of the hybrid as a whole: the MBCDs provide a necessary 
balance to PSIA involvement. 
 
V. Discussion and conclusions 
A current and much studied trend in public service delivery is hybridization. In a hybrid both 
public and private sector organizations are involved in service delivery. This paper discussed two 
key dimensions of hybrids: the proportion of public and private sector involvement, and the 
relationship between public and private sector organizations within a hybrid. As discussed, the 
former dimension has gained increasing attention in scholarship, both theoretically and 
empirically. The latter dimension has received little theoretical and even less empirical attention. 
 This paper adds to our understanding as it provided an enhanced framework for 
analyzing hybrid forms of governance and illustrated this with a comparative case study of a 
single hybrid type, but with two different relationships between the public and private sector 
service providers. The case study demonstrates that different relationships between public and 
private sector service providers may have a different impact on service delivery. This has 
relevance for both the theory  and analysis of hybrids, and for policy making. 
 The case study shows that the relationship between public and private sector service 
providers may, for example, affect a hybrid’s effectiveness or efficiency in reaching its underlying 
goals, or its legitimacy and accountability. For scholars researching hybrids this finding may not 
seem unique: comparable findings have been reported (see section 3). Yet, these findings are 
reported from research into the “amount” of public and private sector service delivery, not from 
specific research into the relationship between the sectors. Given that the relationship also 
affects service delivery, we may now question if previous literature does not draw too positive or 
too negative conclusions on the impact of the “amount” of public and sector involvement. After 
all, the impact the relationship has on the services delivered may strengthen or undo the impact 
the amount of public or private sector involvement has. Future research may be more aware of 
this understanding. 
 For policy making the paper implies that when considering to include private sector 
service delivers alongside public sector service delivers, not only choices should be made about 
what tasks these private sector agencies are allowed to take up; but also a choice needs to be 
made about the relationship between the public and the private sector. The case study presented 
here provided insight into some of the possible outcomes of different relationships in a single 
type of hybrid. More empirical research will be necessary to provide a more nuanced and more 
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complete insight into how and how much different relationships affect service delivery. Only then 
an informed choice may be made on what solution to choose. 
 To conclude, in this paper I targeted a gap in our current knowledge on hybrid forms of 
governance. Many questions remain; some relevant are: to what extent, where and when is a 
certain relationship between public and private sector service providers preferable over the 
other? The answers to such questions are ultimately a matter for further empirical inquiry. 
Through this paper I only seek to put them on the research agenda. 
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Footnotes 
1. One of the reviewers rightfully pointed out that the ecological school is but one in within 
organizational literature, more perspectives exist (for a good overview, see Pugh, 2007; Pugh & 
Hickson, 2007). 
2. Note that I have analyzed a selection of approaches to public and private sector service 
delivery in construction policy in Canadian and Australian jurisdictions – the units of analysis. In 
Australia these are South Australia, New South Wales, Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory 
and Queensland. In Canada these are Ontario, Alberta and the Greater Vancouver Regional 
District. When referring to Australia and Canada in the remainder of this paper, I refer to these 
cases only. 
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Tables  
 
Table 1 – Strengths and weaknesses of delivery of public services public and private sector 
agencies 
 
 Type of service delivery 
 Public sector Private sector 
Strengths 
• Equity (Stone, 2002; Wilson, 1989) 
• Force of law (Baldwin & Cave, 1999; 
Offe, 1984) 
• Democracy (Bader & Engelen, 2003; 
Rothstein, 1998) 
• Efficiency (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; 
Sparrow, 2000) 
• Choice (Rothstein, 1998; Sen, 1988) 
• Flexibility (Baldwin & Cave, 1999; 
Gunningham & Grabosky, 1998) 
Weaknesses 
• Inefficient (Bardach & Kagan, 1982; 
Sparrow, 2000) 
• Inflexible (Baldwin & Cave, 1999; 
Bardach & Kagan, 1982) 
• Costly (Aalders & Wilthagen, 1997; 
Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) 
• Conflicting interests (Gunningham & 
Grabosky, 1998; Hodge & Coghill, 2007) 
• Segregation (Morgan & England, 1988; 
Van Slyke, 2003) 
• Accountability shortfalls (Adams & Evans, 
2004; May, 2007) 
 
 
Table 2 – Overview of hybrid types, arrangement of tasks and possible relationships between 
public and private sector agencies  
 
 Hybrid type 
 Type 1: Solitaries Type 2: Affiliations Type 3: Optionals 
Example Contracting out 
(McDavid, 1985) 
Public-private-
partnership 
(Vining et al., 2005) 
Freedom of choice 
(Rothstein, 1998) 
Arrangement of 
tasks 
Public and private 
sector agencies all 
have clearly defined 
and non-overlapping 
tasks 
In some levels of the 
regime public and 
private sector 
agencies all have their 
own clearly defined 
and non-overlapping 
tasks; in other levels 
In some levels of the 
regime public and 
private sector 
agencies all have their 
own clear defined and 
non-overlapping tasks; 
in other levels they 
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they jointly take up a 
single task. 
individually take up 
similar tasks 
Possible public-
private sector 
relationship 
None* • Merging (durable or 
non-durable) 
• Cooperation (long 
term and 
temporary) 
• Cooperation  
• Complementing 
• Competing 
• Rivaling 
* Note: relationships might exist amongst private sector service providers within the hybrid. The 
focus of this paper is however on relationships between public and private sector service 
providers. 
 
 
Table 3 – Overview of interviewees  
 
 Interviewees’ role in hybrid 
Interviewees’ background Involved in 
policymaking 
Delivering 
services 
Receiving 
services 
Other 
Public official (including MBCD staff) 27 (14/13) 21 (10/11)   
Private sector representative 5 (2/3)    
PSIA staff   14 (9/5)   
Architect/engineer   11 (6/5)  
Builder/contractor/developer   13 (7/6)  
Other professions   5 (1/4)  
Academic    7 (7/0) 
Total 32 (16/16) 35 (19/16) 29 (14/15) 7 (7/0) 
Total number of interviewees: 103 (56/47) 
Note: The numbers between brackets represent number of Australian/Canadian interviewees.  
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Appendix A – Overview of the main research questions (topic and question numbers) 
 
Introduction  
1a What do you think about the quality of the building industry in [jurisdiction]? 
1b To what extent is a certain development perceivable in the building industry? 
 
Why was the new regime introduced? 
2.  Preceding this interview I sent you a short overview, my perception, of the [old and new 
regime] in [jurisdiction]. To what extent is this an accurate description? 
3a  Why was the [new regime] introduced? 
 
How does the regime operate in daily practice? 
5a To what extent can [local government] interfere in the [private sector] assessment 
process? 
5b And to what extent does [local government]? 
6  To what extent has compliance (with building regulations) changed after the introduction 
of [the new regime]? 
7a  To what extent can acceptable evidence be found of the achievement of regulatory 
objectives?  
7b Could you state websites, research reports or articles that might be of help to my further 
research? 
9a To what extent is building control performed equally amongst different groups?  
9b To what extent is building control performed equitably by the different sectors (public 
and private sector enforcement actors)? 
 
How is the regime evaluated? 
3b Do applicants show a preference for either [public or private sector involvement]? 
3c If so, why? 
4a What are the criteria to be allowed to enforce building regulations (for both public and 
private sector actors)? 
4b. Are these criteria realistic (qualitatively and quantitatively)? 
10a  What are the statutory responsibility and liability of different enforcement parties (public 
and private sector actors)? 
10b Are these realistic? 
11a  How are the different enforcement actors (public and private) overseen by [different 
levels of government]? 
11b To what extent is this oversight realistic? 
 
Why are goals that underpin the regime (not) achieved? 
1c Why is building control needed in [jurisdiction]? 
8a What is the most serious obstacle to achieving objectives of the building regulations? 
Why? 
8b What is the second most serious obstacle to achieving objectives? Why? 
8c [If the interviewee mentions more objectives, try to have these ordered.] 
12 If you were allowed to change one thing in the new regime, what would it be? And why? 
 
Final question 
13 Is there anything you think I have missed in this interview, or is there anything you wish 
to add? 
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